My purpose here is to reopen the question of Franklin's moral teaching and outlook as he presents it in his Autobiography; for while Franklin has had no lack of defenders, surprisingly little close attention has been paid to the text of his Autobiography with a view to drawing out the precise character of the moral ideal Franklin is promulgating through it. Such attention reveals a surprisingly subtle and multilayered moral teaching, one that easily escapes most of the criticisms that have been leveled against it. Its presentation is also carefully calibrated to influence the widest and most varied American audience. Education (including moral education) was a matter Franklin took seriously all his life, as many of his writings and projects attest.6 The Autobiography, as it stands, is the final and most comprehensive monument of that concern, undertaking, as it does, to help shape the emerging American character.7 Despite its casual and almost random appearance, the work contains a mature and consistent outlook on morality and the well-lived life and even a distinctive strategy for persuading its readers of the merits of that outlook.8 I do not propose to argue the elevation of Franklin's moral ideal when matched against such competitors as MacIntyre's Aquinas or its purity compared to Parson Weems's puritanism. I do propose, however, that Franklin's Autobiography fulfills much better than either of these the purpose of providing a new nation June 1992 and a newly emerging culture with a model that is appropriate to them, one that makes a bid to elevate them in a manner and to a degree that they are most likely to benefit from. The Franklin of the Autobiography is neither a classical hero nor a saint; but he does embody an ideal of a distinctly modern and democratic sort. In fact, those parts of the Autobiography's teaching that are most decried as vulgar or materialistic stem from Franklin's deep egalitarianism.9 He gives scope to the American impulse for material advancement (which it would not be possible or fair to suppress); but he gives that impulse a push in the direction of virtue and moderation, understood to be sure in a distinctive way. Equally important, he gives Americans an ideal of democratic public service that is quite high-minded, without being beyond the grasp of ordinary citizens. Franklin goes so far as to downplay in the Autobiography elements of his own history that are beyond the reach of ordinary human beings. At the same time, the Autobiography can inspire those who are drawn to the higher stature of Franklin himself, giving them important lessons on the place of a man of superior ability and accomplishment in a democratic milieu.
WEALTH AND VIRTUE
One of the leading themes of the Autobiography and one that Franklin takes evident pleasure in emphasizing is his own astonishing rise from poverty and obscurity to means and celebrity. One of the stated purposes of the work is to accentuate the contrast between his humble beginnings and his later success and to show the means by which it was accomplished (1964, 43). Franklin invites us to contemplate the contrast between his first, bedraggled appearance in Philadelphia and the prosperity and reputation he has since achieved there (p. 75). His first elevation to political office occasions similar reflections (p. 197). It is partly the prominence of this theme that makes the Autobiography's emphasis on worldly success so unmistakable. Permissiveness toward the impulse to material advancement is indeed one of the central-as well as one of the obvious-lessons of the Autobiography. It is also one of the most misunderstood.
The passage on the "Art of Virtue" in part 2 (1964, 148-60), which is probably the most famous in the Autobiography, is typical. Franklin proposes a list of 13 virtues, along with a method (the Art of Virtue) designed to allow anyone to become proficient in them. As an incentive to follow this method, Franklin portrays the virtues as instrumental, as useful. He assures his readers that his own success and happiness in life are owing to their cultivation (p. 157; see also p. 119); he even offers a fundamentally utilitarian general theory of virtue: "Vicious Actions are not hurtful because they are forbidden, but forbidden because they are hurtful, the Nature of Man alone consider'd"; and it is "therefore every one's Interest Franklin is never shy about using money as an incentive to virtue, by insisting that virtue is the surest path to wealth. Precepts of this type are almost as common in the Autobiography as in Poor Richard, and it is these that have caused some to paint Franklin as an unregenerate materialist. In fact, though, they reflect only a recognition on Franklin's part of both the inevitable desire for wealth in people who have little and, just as importantly, the poor prospects for virtue in people who have nothing. It is a simple fact that a certain amount of prosperity is a necessary precondition of virtue in a democratic society like America. And Franklin recognizes that material advancement will inevitably preoccupy most of his audience."2 Tocqueville wrote some fifty years later that effective moral teaching in the new, democratic age would have to reconcile itself, to some degree, to the material and self-centered preoccupations of the majority;13 and Franklin is not blind to this necessity. He is indeed guilty (as his critics claim) of refusing to regard this necessity as a moral failing. Moral education as envisaged by Franklin never attempts to persuade anyone that the ambition for material advancement should be sacrificed on the alter of virtue. In the American context, (as Tocqueville also implied), such a teaching would be both elitist and ineffectual. Franklin seeks, rather, to begin by directing material ambition to virtue as its means and then as its end, as well. The ultimate purpose of Poor Richard's exhortations, as Franklin says, was not to produce a full sack but one that will stand upright (see Lerner 1987, 52; Stourzh 1954, 15-16) .
The notion that virtue is in one's interest in a narrow, economic sense represents only the first level of the Autobiography's moral teaching. As the work's reference to the wisdom of poor Richard implies, the Autobiography seeks to address a wider audienceand deliver a morally less elementary message-than Poor Richard's. This is seen clearly enough in the way the work develops its most materialistic themes. Frugality and industry, key virtues in both Poor Richard and the Autobiography, are fairly narrowly connected to money-making; and Franklin recommends them highly as such. But he also is careful to subordinate them to both higher goods and other virtues that economic well-being paves the way to. He defines frugality as making no expense "but to do good to others or yourself" (1964, 149), and he justifies his inclusion of it and industry in his list of virtues by noting that the wealth they accumulate makes possible greater sincerity and justice (p. 151). Virtue may be "the means of procuring wealth" (as the Autobiography's synopsis of Poor Richard has it), but wealth serves the purpose of "securing Virtue" in turn (p. 159). In his own case, Franklin attributes to frugality and industry the "Acquisition of his Fortune, with all that Knowledge which enabled him to be an useful Citizen, and obtain'd for him some Degree of Reputation among the Learned" (p. 157).
If Franklin makes the virtues (especially frugality and industry) instrumental to the accumulation of wealth, the latter is firmly subordinated to the virtues in turn and to more noble pursuits, including, in Franklin's own case, philosophy or science. The Autobiography's elementary and, we might say, propaedeutic, utilitarianism should not conceal the fact that the work as a whole is actually directed strongly away from the concern for wealth as an end in itself. The example of Franklin's own business career is most eloquent. After prospering as a printer with the aid of his frugality and industry, Franklin retired at the age of 42 with a "sufficient tho' moderate Fortune" to allow him to pursue "Philosophical Studies and Amusements" (1964, 196 ; see also 119, 125). Like almost every American, Franklin had to concern himself with wealth first; but after his needs were comfortably met (Franklin actually became rather wealthy), he retired from commerce for higher pursuits. Franklin's description of these higher pursuits bears more than a passing resemblance to the classical vision of the life of noble leisure, especially when we add to it the public service that was immediately pressed upon him, which he accepted.
The Autobiography first caters to the reader's presumptive (and presumptively legitimate) concern with wealth, then directs it toward a much fuller vision of human happiness and the well-lived life. Public service, a reasonable or tolerant skepticism, and benevolent sociability are the elements of this vision that we shall concern ourselves with. For the present, we should notice that while the Autobiography shows us a number of ways in which Franklin learned or changed his perspective over the course of his life, it never shows us a time when his concern was purely commercial or monetary. This is true to fact. In one of his youthful "Busy-Body"essays for example, Franklin 
THE VIRTUE OF REASONABLENESS
Once we get beyond the simple view of the Franklin of the Autobiography as a stern master of bourgeois discipline or a mercenary and try to explore more seriously his view of the place of virtue in a well-lived life, we are met with an entirely different set of puzzles. Despite the fact that the Autobiography tries to inspire its readers with a sincere devotion to virtue, Franklin's own devotion as portrayed at points in the work has to be described as casual at best. A gentle irony suffuses his account of the art of virtue, which began as a youthful "Project of achieving moral perfection" (see Sayre 1963, 522 This remarkable indulgence can be explained only partially by the fact that the work itself is addressed to a son who may have been a product of one of these intrigues. It can also be explained only partially by the fact that the art of virtue is designed to put a level of virtue within the grasp of every man and that like many of the sayings of Poor Richard, it thus represents the beginning, rather than the end, of a full human life (see Meyer 1987, 158). The fact is that Franklin's moral teaching as a whole is conspicuously more tolerant than that of many of his religious or philosophical forebears. In fact, it is one of the principal, if less explicit, purposes of the Autobiography to combat the kind of moralism that had been characteristic of earlier traditions, particularly those of Puritan America. The moral code Franklin wants to replace them with, however, is somewhat elusive.
One way to get at Franklin's own moral outlook is by asking what in his view justifies a new moral tolerance. In the Autobiography, this tolerance is grounded partially in a distinctive notion of reasonableness. Franklin's reasonableness is different from the rationalism typical of the eighteenth century. Eighteenth-century rationalism sought answers to scientific, moral, and religious questions by means of unassisted human reason; and Franklin does likewise. But governing the operation of his rationalism is a pragmatic and skeptical bon sens, which, among other things, acts as a brake on speculative reason itself. This "reasonableness" is prior to morality and even to a religion, in the sense that it governs and moderates them. It is the resolute enemy of intolerance and zealotry, even the zealotry of reason. It is this trait, as much as wealth or virtue, that accounts for Franklin's happiness and the pleasing character of his example. In the course of a rather turbulent life, Franklin remains the picture of equanimity, kept always on an even keel by his earthy reasonableness, an amiable trait that is infectious-and is meant to be.
According to the Autobiography, this trait was not native to Franklin. His early inclination was, rather, to dogmatism. Upon reading a tract at age 16 equating flesh eating with murder, he became a principled vegetarian (1964, 63) . This lasted until he was sorely tempted by some cod during his first voyage to Philadelphia. "I balanced some time between Principle and Inclination," Franklin says, then reasoned that since the cod were seen to have smaller fish in their stomachs, he could eat them in turn (p. 87). He concludes, "So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable Creature, since it enables one to find or make a Reason for every thing one has a mind to do" Franklin's London employer thought this production abominable, and the mature Franklin concurs (1964, 96, 114; see also p. 74). In the Autobiography, Franklin mentions the work only to disown it and to make a point about what he learned from it. He says he abandoned its doctrine when he discovered that it "/perverted" some of the friends he imparted it to, who "afterwards wronged me greatly without the least Compunction" (p. 114; see also pp. 89-90). He concluded that "this Doctrine tho' it might be true, was not very useful" and at the same time "grew convinced that Truth, Sincerity and Integrity in Dealings between Man and Man"-qualities undermined by the doctrine-are necessary to the felicity of life (ibid.). Guided by this new insight, he gave up his speculative creed for something new.
The lesson we are supposed to draw from this episode is complex. Franklin's abandoning Deism on the grounds of disutility "tho' it might be true" is not as misologist as it sounds; for he immediately adds that he suspected some error had crept into his reasoning, making it neither true nor useful. But Franklin claims that such errors and their effects are "~common in metaphysical Reasonings" (1964, 114), which constitutes an indictment of at least a certain type or application of reason. In a letter to Benjamin Vaughan of November 9, 1779, Franklin confided that the Dissertation, together with a later essay maintaining more or less the opposite thesis, caused him to abandon this type of speculation altogether: "The great uncertainty I found in metaphysical reasonings disgusted me, and I quitted that kind of reading and study for others more satisfactory" [1907] 1970, vol. 6, pp. 410-13, esp. 412). The abandonment of speculative or metaphysical reason, however, is not the abandonment of reason per se. As the Autobiography and his entire oeuvre make clear, Franklin remains a dedicated rationalist. But his rationalism is informed by a strong sense of the limits of pure speculation.
Franklin's mature attitude is captured in his wellknown address at the conclusion of the Federal Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia: "I confess, that I do not entirely approve of this Constitution at present; but, Sir, I am not sure I shall never approve it; for, having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged, by better information or fuller consideration, to change my opinions even on important subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is therefore that, the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment of others." ([1907] 1970, vol. 9, pp. 607-9).17 The Convention had failed to adopt any of his major proposals (Becker 1931, 595) ;18 but by the end, Franklin held that the practical matter of administering the government well was more important than the grand theories of government bandied about the convention ([1907] 1970, vol. 9, pp. 608-9).19 This does not mean that he despairs of rational guidance in matters of government, only that such guidance will be halting and must constantly be tested against experience.
One of the key lessons of the Autobiography concerns the fallibility of human reason when pushed into the realm of pure speculation; but Franklin does not push this too far, either. Readers of the work gain a sense of the incompleteness of our knowledge but in a way that leads to moderation, rather than debilitating skepticism. What Franklin calls Reasonableness serves in the Autobiography to block the implementation of speculative conclusions in philosophy or theology; but it does so in the name of Franklin's own more earthy and commonsensical understanding of the proper way of life. It is in this spirit that the work launches a gentle but pervasive and insistent assault on religious dogmatism. The Autobiography is unquestionably at its most satirical in portraying dogmatic sectarians. Most unforgettable is Samuel Keimer, Franklin's first employer in Philadelphia. Keimer, a man of unconventional (not to say ludicrous) religious beliefs, was so impressed with young Ben's abilities in debate that he proposed to establish a new religious sect, with himself in the place of the prophet and Franklin as the confuter of opponents (1964, 88). This does not mean that Franklin is pushing his readers to irreligion, however; for another of the key lessons of the Autobiography is that religion can and should be reasonable. Franklin pointedly approves of the Dunkers, a sect that refused to publish its doctrines, on the grounds that they might later have to be changed (1964, Franklin's religious tolerance shares some of the characteristic paradoxes of American toleration. His own generic creed paves the way to maximum toleration; but it can have this effect only to the extent that others are brought, like him, to see all doctrines not in it as "nonessential." According to the creed, the divinity of Christ is nonessential,21 as are myriad doctrines less fundamental but more controversial in the American context. Moreover, Franklin's toleration is qualified by the social thrust of his own religious concern. He finds that individual sects are worthy of more or less respect, depending upon how well they support morality and social concord (1964, 146). Some doctrines might obviously detract from these, but Franklin has little patience even with those that do not contribute adequately to them. He tells us that when he realized that the minister of his own congregation desired "rather to make us Presbyterians than good Citizens," in disgust he stopped attending his services (p. 147).
What Franklin says about his experience with Deism seems to contain the key to his attitude. We recall that that experience taught him the overriding importance of "Truth, Sincerity and Integrity in Dealings between Man and Man." This ideal is fully visible in his own creed, and it is by this standard that he now judges at least the extraneous or supernumerary dogmas of all sects. As a result, Franklin's approach to religion is primarily social and moral-indeed, this-worldly rather than otherwordly. It is "reasonable" in the sense of taking its bearing by experience, by what is visible; and it brackets, as much as possible, all purely theological questions. In effect, he subjects religion to a test of social utility. Whether Franklin is an unalloyed utilitarian in religion is a subtle question, depending upon whether even his core religious principles are derived simply from his conviction that they are useful to society. This question cannot be answered with certainty here-perhaps not anywhere. It does, however, allow us to understand something more about the important question of Franklin's utilitarianism. When explaining his attitude toward biblical revelation, for example, Franklin has the following to say: "I entertain'd an Opinion, that tho' certain Actions might not be bad because they were forbidden by it, or good because it commanded them; yet probably those Actions might be forbidden because they were bad for us, or commanded because they were beneficial to us, in their own Natures, all the Circumstances of things considered" (1964, 115). Thus, the Gospels' moral strictures are considered valid not as revealed truth but as principles of utility. And although Franklin specifically denies that his own religious principles are derived from revelation (pp. 114-15), he does apply the same kind of calculus to morals in general. Speaking of the treatise he intended to write on the art of virtue, he says, "It was my Design to explain and enforce this Doctrine, that vicious Actions are not hurtful because they are forbidden, but forbidden because they are hurtful, the Nature of Man alone considered That it was therefore every one's Interest to be virtuous, who wish'd to be happy even in this World" (p. 158). These are the classic statements of Franklin's moral utilitarianism. Since they reduce morality and religion quite clearly to self-interest, they make Franklin appear to some to be nothing but a vulgar mercenary. But Franklin's argument harbors some subtleties that need to be noticed. Utilitarianism can take many forms; and the elevation or debasement of each depends upon the goods, or the vision of the human good, that it rests upon or is directed toward. Things can be judged "useful" or the reverse only with reference to these goods, considered as goals. As the second of these passages points out, the real issue is the nature of man and what truly conduces to his happiness. In the Autobiography, this passage follows a general account of the utility of the virtues to Franklin's own happiness, where he makes clear that for him, happiness includes prosperity and reputation, as well as learning and public service (p. 157). In the first passage, the proviso that moral actions are beneficial to us "all the Circumstances of things considered" seems also to allude to a rich understanding of the human good that underlies utility for Franklin. This passage is part of Franklin's account of his turn away from Deism and his adoption of the view that "Truth, Sincerity and Integrity in Dealings between Man and Man" are necessary to the felicity of life (p. 114). It is with reference to this ideal that religion, as well as virtue, are recommended as "useful" by Franklin in the Autobiography. In addition to its richness, his ideal fully connects the individual and the social good. But it is only adumbrated in these two passages; its full articulation is seen only in the portrait of Franklin's life as a whole in the Autobiography.
Utilitarianism, as Franklin envisions it, is anything but mercenary or impoverished, because the goal or purpose that drives it is generous and humane. In fact, Franklin might have found inspiration for it in the Socrates of Xenophon's Memorabilia, which he encountered and admired at an early age, and which also makes use of utilitarian logic (Franklin 1964 The indulgent or forgiving character of Franklin's moral outlook, at least when measured against those of some of his critics, thus has two sources. The first is his utilitarianism. Every utilitarian approach to morals refuses to treat virtue as an end in itself, and Franklin quite frankly says that virtue and at least part of religion are normative only because they contribute to individual happiness and the social good. Franklin is fully aware of the character of his argument and how it diverges from other perspectives-pious perspectives, in particular. Yet much of the criticism he has faced-that which makes him a mercenary simply because he regards virtue as a means to something else-is rooted in precisely the "deontological" approach to morals he rejects (see Pangle 1988, 18 ). For Franklin, there is nothing more natural than for there to be a happy coincidence of virtue and utility and nothing more ill conceived than to propose a radical separation of the two.
In addition, Franklin's distinctive vision of how extramoral human goals and appetites fit into a full and happy life makes his utilitarianism more indulgent than others'. For him, wealth, power, and reputation, as well as virtue, are legitimate parts of such a life. Here, the crucial contribution comes from Franklin's own experience of the felicity of life, which has persuaded him that much more of human nature can safely be indulged than earlier moralists had thought. His good-humored concessions to his own lack of orderliness and pride, his view of chastity, and even his rejection of vegetarianism reflect Franklin's assessment of how far moral strictures may be relaxed. This is reflected, as well, in the half-humorous proposal he once penned to devise scientific means of scenting intestinal gas so that flatulence might become socially acceptable ([1907] 1970 952-55). Franklin is at all times in favor of liberating innocuous natural impulses. The suppression of human appetites in the name of transcendent goals unrelated to human happiness simply appears nonsensical-unreasonable-to him. Reasonableness for Franklin consists precisely in affirming appetite where appetite contributes to human happiness and where nothing more than speculative grounds can be given for disturbing it. It is a kind of moderation directed against the excesses of moralism itself.
Franklin's vision of the good life, which lies behind all of this, is the greatest unifying theme of the Autobiography. It is a vision that serves not only individual happiness, but the good of society as a whole. But just as Franklin has altered our understanding of virtue to fit his vision of the good life, so he has thought his way to a new and distinctive view of the best social order and thus of the proper nature of sociability. A vision of society that combines in typical fashion benevolence and utility, together with a rather complicated egalitarianism, might be called the capstone of the Autobiography as a whole.
THE ART OF SOCIABILITY
If there is one thing that every reader of the Autobiography comes to admire and to envy in Franklin, it is his remarkable sociability. The facility with which he makes friends is a constant source of delight to his readers and an evident source of both delight and utility to himself. It is part of Franklin's uniqueness to have been not only universally renowned but universally beloved in his own day." Still more remarkable was his amazing success in mastering all of the milieux he moved in-and these were as varied almost as the world had to offer-without being the less loved for it. From the Boston of his earliest youth, to the more freewheeling business and intellectual world of Philadelphia, to imperial London, and finally to the royal court of France, he displayed an unerring ability to influence events by the friendly force of his character. In all the machinations of his public career, he seems to have made only one serious misreading of men or events.23 The Autobiography, which covers none of Franklin's career as an international diplomatist, devotes considerable attention to his facility with people and aims to communicate something of that facility to us. In typical fashion, Franklin attributes his social success to a number of techniques and distills them into what amounts to an art of sociability that may be practiced by anyone. Also in typical fashion, this art looks to both pleasure and utility. The problems it is designed to overcome are partly those encountered by ordinary citizens and partly those confronted by men of superior achievement or ability who aspire to exert leadership in the novel circumstances of egalitarian society.
In the Autobiography Franklin portrays his sociability, like his reasonableness, as an acquisition or contrivance, rather than as something native to him. In some ways, the two are sides of a coin. His early encounter with books of "polemic Divinity" led him not only to the intellectual vice of dogmatism but to the social vice of contentiousness-a defect rarely found in men of good sense, The principal obstacle to proper sociability is pride. Arrogant habits of speech block all its potential for good, disrupting society, as well as the genuine pleasure of conversation. Franklin's own experience has taught him the tenacity of this problem. He admits that when he was developing his art of virtue, it took the prodding of a Quaker friend to get him to add the virtue of humility to his list. He made it his thirteenth virtue and in this context associates it primarily with modesty in speech (1964, 159) . He also confesses to the difficulty of acquiring it: humility forces him to forgo the "pleasure" of immediately contradicting others' errors, a discipline that does "some violence to natural Inclination" (ibid.).
Due to this difficulty, Franklin informs us, he has not truly succeeded in acquiring humility, only its appearance. But for social purposes (what concerns Franklin primarily here) this has been perfectly adequate. Under the virtue of humility, Franklin had written "Imitate Jesus and Socrates" (1964, 150); but it seems that in this respect his imitatio Christi is confined to externals. One reason why Franklin accepts this with such good humor is that neither his view of individual virtue nor of social relations is one from which all pride or even vanity has been purged. That would require a sterner discipline than Franklin is willing to impose, especially since he finds redeeming elements in human pride, beginning with his own. At the onset of the Autobiography he admits ("since my Denial of it will be believ'd by no body") that the work is motivated partly by vanity. But vanity, he says, is something he has learned to indulge, since it "is often productive of Good to the Possessor and to others that are within his Sphere of Action," as well as being one of the "Comforts of Life" (p. 144). As always, the combination of private pleasure and social utility is an irresistable one for Franklin's view of sociability, resting on modesty of speech, cultivation of at least the outward forms of humility, and indulgence of mistaken pride in others, is appropriate, especially in the new kind of society Franklin was attempting to shape. In modern democratic or egalitarian society, as much pride must be indulged in each as civility will bear. Special forbearance will be practiced by those who take the lead in sociability, as Franklin hopes each of his readers will do. But Franklin is the last to think this will be the way with all and is fully aware that those who take such a lead will likely be a minority. The problem of sociability thus opens something of a breech in the smoothly democratic exterior of the Autobiography-a breech that becomes wider and more significant, the closer one looks; for out of the art of sociability Franklin develops an art of leadership that is egalitarian in its benevolence toward the public at large but is more exclusive in its audience. In his praise of modest speech, Franklin had put special emphasis on the "Power of doing Good" that modesty would place in the hands of "wellmeaning sensible Men" (1964, 65). These men are like Franklin in his capacity as a projector and a leader-as something other than Everyman. Franklin notes that the humble manner of speech and demeanor he developed was vital not only in smoothing his social relations but in advancing the many projects he undertook during his life and in taking the lead in practical affairs in general (p. 160). It not only brought him good will but allowed him to draw men along by persuasion, without bruising their pride or vanity.
If sociability in a democratic context requires special attention to the universalized claims of pride, the exercise of leadership compounds the difficulties. Leadership, which always requires the careful management of human vanity, is given special delicacy in the democratic milieu as Franklin understands it. Every man demands-and merits-respect; and the leader cannot proceed peremptorily. But Franklin does not take the democratic perspective so exclusively as to think this is the only problem, nor does he think democratic leadership should concern itself only with accommodating the pride of followers. There is also the legitimate pride of the leader. Franklin's own pride is concealed but not conquered; and it stands to reason that the "future great men," for whose benefit, among others, Benjamin Vaughan exhorted Franklin to publish his Autobiography (1964, 135), will be at least as proud. In order to put this problem in its proper perspective we must first realize that in predemocratic Western societies (indeed, in the London and Paris of Franklin's experience) such pride was an unquestioned virtue. Under the name of honor, it forms, in fact, the copestone of every aristocratic social order. Franklin is willing, in self-effacing democratic fashion, to call the leader's pride "vanity" and accommodate it to the new social circumstances for which he is writing. But he is not willing to sacrifice it on the alter of egalitarianism. If vanity in its ordinary forms, properly directed, can be productive of much good, the pride that will motivate future Franklins is even more to be cherished. The difficulty is to satisfy both, to give scope to the leader's pride without offending that of his followers.
This cannot be done without a certain amount of subterfuge, and that is one of the things Franklin's art of sociable democratic leadership provides. When seeking supporters for a early project of his, Franklin discovered that resistance was created by the supposition that the project's success would raise his reputation even "the smallest degree" above that of his followers (1964, 143). Here, democratic pride is seen in its ugly form as resentment. Franklin did not, and does not, believe this resentment can simply be done away with, so he developed a ruse for concealing his leadership to get around it. By presenting schemes as the idea of "a number of friends" or of "some publick-spirited Gentlemen" who seek wider support, he advises us, opposition rooted in envy or distrust of ambition can be forestalled. He recommends this device to any who would lead effectively (pp. 143, 193). The vanity of followers is assuaged, and the leader's projects go forward more smoothly; but the real beauty of this device, Franklin assures us, is that in the end there is no real sacrifice of the leader's pride: "If it remains a while uncertain to whom the Merit belongs, some one more vain than yourself will be encouraged to claim it, and then even envy will be dispos'd to do you Justice, by plucking those assum'd Feathers, and restoring them to their right Owner" (p. 143). If Franklin is to be thought of as the apostle of postponed gratification, this might be the best example of it in the Autobiography. Precisely by adopting a low profile in deference to the pride of others-by being humble in appearance-the leader garners the praise he wants and deserves. Franklin believes this and devices like it to be necessary to effective leadership in the circumstances he-and we-confront.
The Autobiography gives us enough examples of this kind of self-concealment to make it a theme of the work. His first published essays were submitted anonymously to his brother's newspaper, to gain them a fair hearing (1964, 67-68). His long-standing intellectual club, the Junto, was a semisecret organization. Along with ancillary clubs established on the same model, Franklin says the Junto was useful as means of preparing the public mind for projects he later wished to take in hand (pp. 170-71, 173-74). He once formed a plan for a larger group to be called the Society of the Free and Easy, which was to begin as a secret party whose members had trained themselves in his art of virtue and subscribed to his religious creed and who would, in unison, have an impact on public affairs (pp. 161-63). Franklin claims this group was never formed; but he still believes it useful and possible, "as I have always thought that one man of tolerable Abilities may work great Changes, and accomplish great Affairs among Mankind, if he first forms a good Plan" and prosecutes it assiduously to its conclusion (p. 163). This particular plan began with the formation of a secret elite.
The culmination of Franklin's instruction in sociability is an exhortation to public service addressed to everyone; but the most productive kind of public service is carried out by a man who is willing to take the lead while operating within the constraints of the new social setting. Franklin brings a thoroughly democratic sensibility to public service, but he does not blind himself to the fact that the new conditions are 19. Alexander Pope, one of Franklin's favorite authors, produced the famous couplet on this theme: "For forms of government let fools contest; / Whate'er is best administered is best" (Essay on Man 3.303-4). The succeeding couplet could serve as motto for Franklin's attitude toward religion: "For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight; / His can't be wrong whose life is in the right." 20. Franklin also says he never doubted either that God governs the world with his providence or that the best service to God is service to man. Yet his Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain at least comes very close to denying these things. When speaking about what the notoriously elusive and ironic Franklin actually believed in religious matters, we must be on our guard. Here, especially, we might be mindful of the loophole in his definition of the virtue of sincerity, "Use no hurtful Deceit" (1964, 150) .
21. In a letter to Ezra Stiles of March 9, 1790, very near the end of his life, Franklin repeats his religious principles. In response to a query by Stiles, he allows that the "System of Morals" propounded by Jesus is "the best the World ever saw or is likely to see" but that his divinity "is a question I do not dogmatize upon, having never studied it, and think it needless to busy myself with it now, when I expect soon an Opportunity of knowing the Truth with less 
